XI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL SOCIAL CONDUCT





Morality has been defined in many ways. t has been called "a regulation

and control of immediate promptings of impulses in conformity with some

prescribed conduct"; as "the organization of activity with reference to

a system of fundamental values." Dewey says, "nterest in community

welfare, an interest that is intellectual and practical, as well as

emotional--an interest, that is to say, in perceiving whatever makes for

social order and progress, and in carrying these principles into

execution--is the moral habit."[17] Palmer defines it as "the choice by

the individual of habits of conduct that are for the good of the race."

All these definitions point to control on the part of the individual as

one essential of morality.



Morality is not, then, a matter primarily of mere conduct. t involves

conduct, but the essence of morality lies deeper than the act itself;

motive, choice, are involved as well. Mere law-abiding is not morality

in the strict sense of the word. One may keep the laws merely as a

matter of blind habit. A prisoner in jail keeps the laws. A baby of four

keeps the laws, but in neither case could such conduct be called moral.

n neither of these cases do we find "control" by the individual of

impulses, nor "conscious choice" of conduct. n the former compulsion

was the controlling force, and in the second blind habit based on

personal satisfaction. Conduct which outwardly conforms to social law

and social progress is unmoral rather than moral. A moment's

consideration will suffice to convince any one that the major part of

conduct is of this non-moral type. This is true of adults and

necessarily true of children. As Hall says, most of the supposedly moral

conduct of the majority of men is blind habit, not thoughtful choosing.

n so far as we are ruled by custom, by tradition, in so far as we do as

the books or the preacher says, or do as we see others do, without

principles to guide us, without thinking, to that extent the conduct is

likely to be non-moral. This is the characteristic reaction of the

majority of people. We believe as our fathers believed, we vote the same

ticket, hold in horror the same practices, look askance on the same

doctrines, cling to the same traditions. Morality, on the other hand, is

rationalized conduct. Now this non-moral conduct is valuable so far as

it goes. t is a conservative force, making for stability, but it has

its dangers. t is antagonistic to progress. So long as the conditions

surrounding the non-moral individual remain unchanged, he will be

successful in dealing with them, but if conditions change, if he is

confronted by a new situation, if strong temptation comes, he has

nothing with which to meet it, for his conduct was blind. t is the

person whose conduct is non-moral that suffers collapse on the one hand,

or becomes a bigot on the other, when criticism attacks what he held as

true or right. Morality requires that men have a reason for the faith

that is in them.



n the second place, morality is conduct. deals, ideas, wishes,

desires, all may lead to morality, but in so far as they are not

expressed in conduct, to that extent they do not come under the head of

morality. One may express the sublimest idea, may claim the highest

ideals, and be immoral. Conduct is the only test of morality, just as it

is the ultimate test of character. Not only is morality judged in terms

of conduct, but it is judged according as the conduct is consistent.

"Habits of conduct" make for morality or immorality. t is not the

isolated act of heroism that makes a man moral, or the single unsocial

act that makes a man immoral. The particular act may be moral or

immoral, and the person be just the reverse. t is the organization of

activity, it is the habits a man has that places him in one category or

the other.



n the third place, morality is a matter of individual responsibility.

t is "choice by the individual," the "perceiving whatever makes for

social order and progress." No one can choose for another, no one can

perceive for another. The burden of choosing for the good of the group

rests on the individual, it cannot be shifted to society or the Church,

or any other institution. Each individual is moral or not according as

he lives up to the light that he has, according as he carries into

execution principles that are for the good of his race. A particular

act, then, may be moral for one individual and immoral for another, and

non-moral for still another.



n the third place, morality is a matter of individual responsibility.

t is "choice be the individual," the "perceiving whatever makes for

social order and progress." No one can choose for another, no one can

perceive for another. The burden of Choosing for the good of the group

rests on the individual, it cannot be shifted to society or the Church,

or any other institution. Each individual is moral or not according as

he lives up to the light that he has, according as he carries into

execution principles that are for the good of his race. A particular

act, then, may be moral for one individual and immoral for another, and

non-moral for still another.



To go off into the forest to die if one is diseased may be a moral act

for a savage in central Africa; but for a civilized man to do so would

probably be immoral because of his greater knowledge. To give liquor to

babies to quiet them may be a non-moral act on the part of ignorant

immigrants from Russia; but for a trained physician to do so would be

immoral. Morality, then, is a personal matter, and the responsibility

for it rests on the individual.



Of course this makes possible the setting up of individual opinion as to

what is for the good of the group in opposition to tradition and custom.

This is, of course, dangerous if it is mere opinion or if it is carried

to an extreme. Few men have the gift of seeing what makes for social

well-being beyond that of the society of thoughtful people of their

time. And yet if a man has the insight, if his investigations point to a

greater good for the group from doing something which is different from

the standards held by his peers, then morality requires that he do his

utmost to bring about such changes. f it is borne in mind that every

man is the product of his age and that it is evolution, not revolution,

that is constructive, this essential of true morality will not seem so

dangerous. All the reformers the world has ever seen, all the pioneers

in social service, have been men who, living up to their individual

responsibility, have acted as they believed for society's best good in

ways that were not in accord with the beliefs of the majority of their

time. Shirking responsibility, not living up to what one believes is

right, is immoral just as truly as stealing from one's neighbor.



The fourth essential in moral conduct is that it be for the social good.

t is the governing of impulses, the inhibition of desires that violate

the good of the group, and the choice of conduct that forwards its

interests. This does not mean that the group and the individual are set

over against each other, and the individual must give way. t means,

rather, that certain impulses, tendencies, motives, of the individual

are chosen instead of others; it means that the individual only becomes

his fullest self as he becomes a social being; it means that what is for

the good of the group in the long run is for the good of the units that

make up that group. Morality, then, is a relative term. What is of

highest moral value in one age may be immoral in another because of

change in social conditions. As society progresses, as different

elements come to the front because of the march of civilization, so the

acts that are detrimental to the good of the whole must change. To-day

slander and stealing a man's good name are quite as immoral as stealing

his property. Acts that injure the mental and spiritual development of

the group are even more immoral than those which interfere with the

physical well-being.



A strong will is not necessarily indicative of a good character. A

strong will may be directed towards getting what gives pleasure to

oneself, irrespective of the effect on other people. t is the goal, the

purpose with which it is exercised, that makes a man with a strong will

a moral man or an immoral man. Only when one's will is used to put into

execution those principles that will bring about social progress is it

productive of a good character.



Thus it is seen that morality can be discussed only in connection with

group activity. t is the individual as a part of a group, acting in

connection with it, that makes the situation a moral one. ndividual

morality is discussed by some authors, but common opinion limits the

term to the use that has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs.



f social well-being is taken in its broadest sense, then all moral

behavior is social, and all social behavior comes under one of the three

types of morality. Training for citizenship, for social efficiency, for

earning a livelihood, all have a moral aspect. t is only as the

individual is trained to live a complete life as one of a group that he

can be trained to be fully moral, and training for complete social

living must include training in morality. Hence for the remainder of

this discussion the two terms will be considered as synonymous. We hear

it sometimes said, "training in morals and manners," as if the two were

distinct, and yet a full, realization of what is for social betterment

along emotional and intellectual lines must include a realization of the

need of manners. Of course there are degrees of morality or immorality

according as the act influences society much or little--all crimes are

not equally odious, nor all virtues equally commendable, but any act

that touches the well-being of the group must come under this category.



From the foregoing paragraph, the logical conclusion would be that there

is no instinct or inborn tendency that is primarily and distinctly moral

as over against those that are social. That is the commonly accepted

belief to-day. There is no moral instinct. Morality finds its root in

the original nature of man, but not in a single moral instinct. t is,

on the other hand, the outgrowth of a number of instincts all of which

have been listed under the head of the social instinct. Man has in his

original equipment tendencies that will make him a moral individual _if_

they are developed, but they are complex, not simple. Some of these

social tendencies which are at the root of moral conduct are

gregariousness, desire for approval, dislike of scorn, kindliness,

attention to human beings, imitation, and others. Now, although man

possesses these tendencies as a matter of original equipment, he also

possesses tendencies which are opposed to these, tendencies which lead

to the advancement of self, rather than the well-being of the group.

Some of these are fighting, mastery, rivalry, jealousy, ownership. Which

of these sets of tendencies is developed and controls the life of the

individual is a matter of training and environment. n the last chapter

it was pointed out that morality was much more susceptible to

environmental influences than intellectual achievement, because it was

much more a direction and guidance of capacities and tendencies

possessed by every one. One's character is largely a product of one's

environment. n proof of this, read the reports of reform schools, and

the like. Children of criminal parents, removed from the environment of

crime, grow up into moral persons. The pair of Jukes who left the Juke

clan lost their criminal habits and brought up a family of children who

were not immoral. Education cannot produce geniuses, but it can produce

men and women whose chief concern is the well-being of the group.



From a psychological point of view the "choice by the individual of

habits of conduct that are for the good of the group" involves three

considerations: First, the elements implied in such conduct; second, the

stages of development; third, the laws governing this development.

First, moral conduct involves the use of habits, but these must be

rational habits, so it involves the power to think and judge in order to

choose. But thinking that shall result in the choice of habits that are

for the well-being of the group must use knowledge. The individual must

have facts and standards at his disposal by means of which he may

evaluate the possible lines of action presented. Further, an individual

may know intellectually what is right and moral and yet not care. The

interest, the emotional appeal, may be lacking, hence he must have

ideals to which he has given his allegiance, which will force him to put

into practice what his knowledge tells him is right. And then, having

decided what is for the social good and having the desire to carry it

out, the moral man must be able to put it into execution. He must have

the "will power." Morality, then, is an extremely complex matter,

involving all the powers of the human being, intellectual, emotional,

and volitional--involving the cooeperation of heredity and environment.

t is evident that conduct that is at so high a level, involving

experience, powers of judgment, and control, cannot be characteristic of

the immature individual, but must come after years of growth, if at all.

Therefore we find stages of development towards moral conduct.



The first stage of development, which lasts up into the pre-adolescent

years, is the non-moral stage. The time when a child may conform

outwardly to moral law, but only as a result of blind habit--not as a

result of rational choice. t is then that the little child conforms to

his environment, reflecting the characters of the people by whom he is

surrounded. Right to him means what those about him approve and what

brings him satisfaction. f stealing and lying meet with approval from

the people about him, they are right to him. To steal and be caught is

wrong to the average child of the streets, because that brings

punishment and annoyance. He has no standards of judging other than the

example of others and his own satisfaction and annoyance. The non-moral

period, then, is characterized by the formation of habits--which

outwardly conform to moral law, or are contrary to it, according as his

environment directs.



The need to form habits that do conform, that are for the social good,

is evident. By having many habits of this kind formed in early

childhood, truthfulness, consideration for others, respect for poverty,

promptness, regularity, taking responsibility, and so on, the dice are

weighted in favor of the continuation of such conduct when reason

controls. The child has then only to enlarge his view, build up his

principles in accord with conduct already in operation--he needs only to

rationalize what he already possesses. On the other hand, if during

early years his conduct violates moral law, he is in the grip of habits

of great strength which will result in two dangers. He may be blind to

the other side, he may not realize how his conduct violates the laws of

social progress; or, knowing, he may not care enough to put forth the

tremendous effort necessary to break these habits and build up the

opposite. From the standpoint of conduct this non-moral period is the

most important one in the life of the child. n it the twig is bent. To

urge that a child cannot understand and therefore should be excused for

all sorts of conduct simply evades the issue. He is forming habits--that

cannot be prevented; the question is, Are those habits in line with the

demands of social efficiency or are they in violation of it?



But character depends primarily on deliberate choice. We dare not rely

on blind habit alone to carry us through the crises of social and

spiritual adjustment. There will arise the insistent question as to

whether the habitual presupposition is right. Occasions will occur when

several possible lines of conduct suggest themselves; what kind of

success will one choose, what kind of pleasure? Choice, personal choice,

will be forced upon the individual. This problem does not usually grow

acute until early adolescence, although it may along some lines present

itself earlier. When it appears will depend to a large extent on the

environment. For some people in some directions it never comes. t

should come gradually and spontaneously. This period is the period of

transition, when old habits are being scrutinized, when standards are

being formulated and personal responsibility is being realized, when

ideals are made vital and controlling. t may be a period of storm and

stress when the youth is in emotional unrest; when conduct is erratic

and not to be depended on; when there is reaction against authority of

all kinds. These characteristics are unfortunate and are usually the

result of unwise treatment during the first period. f, on the other

hand, the period of transition is prepared for during the preadolescent

years by giving knowledge, opportunities for self-direction and choice,

the change should come normally and quietly. The transition period

should be characterized by emphasis upon personal responsibility for

conduct, by the development of social ideals, and by the cementing of

theory and practice. This period is an ever recurring one.



The transition period is followed by the period of true morality during

which the conduct chosen becomes habit. The habits characteristic of

this final period are different from the habits of the non-moral period,

in that they have their source in reason, whereas those of the early

period grew out of instincts. This is the period of most value, the

period of steady living in accordance with standards and ideals which

have been tested by reason and found to be right. The transition period

is wasteful and uncertain. True morality is the opposite. But so long as

growth in moral matters goes on there is a continuous change from

transition period to truly moral conduct and back again to a fresh

transition period and again a change to morality of a still higher

order. Each rationalized habit but paves the way for one still higher.

Morality, then, should be a continual evolution from level to level.

Only so is progress in the individual life maintained.



Morality, then, requires the inhibition of some instincts and the

perpetuation of others, the formation of habits and ideals, the

development of the power to think and judge, the power to react to

certain abstractions such as ought, right, duty, and so on, the power to

carry into execution values accepted. The general laws of instinct, of

habit, the response by piecemeal association, the laws of attention and

appreciation, are active in securing these responses that we call moral,

just as they are operative in securing other responses that do not come

under this category. t is only as these general psychological laws are

carried out sufficiently that stable moral conduct is secured. Any

violation of these laws invalidates the result in the moral field just

as it would in any other. There is not one set of principles governing

moral conduct and another set governing all other types of conduct. The

same general laws govern both. This being true, there is no need of

discussing in detail the operation of laws controlling moral

conduct--that has all been covered in the previous chapters. However,

there are some suggestions which should be borne in mind in the

application of these laws to this field.



First, it is a general principle that habits, to be fixed and stable,

must be followed by satisfactory results and that working along the

opposite line, that of having annoyance follow a lapse in the conduct,

is uneconomical and unreliable. This principle applies particularly to

moral habits. Truth telling, bravery, obedience, generosity, thought for

others, church going, and so on must be followed by positive

satisfaction, if they are to be part of the warp and woof of life.

Punishing falsehood, selfishness, cowardice, and so on is not enough,

for freedom from supervision will usually mean rejection of such forced

habits. A child must find that it pays to be generous; that he is

happier when he cooeperates with others than when he does not. Positive

satisfaction should follow moral conduct. Of course this satisfaction

must vary in type with the age and development of the child, from

physical pleasure occasioned by an apple as a reward for self-control at

table to the satisfaction which the consciousness of duty well done

brings to the adolescent.



Second, the part played by suggestion in bringing about moral habits and

ideals must be recognized. The human personalities surrounding the child

are his most influential teachers in this line. This influence of

personalities begins when the child is yet a baby. Reflex imitation

first, and later conscious imitation plus the feeling of dependence

which a little child has for the adults in his environment, results in

the child reflecting to a large extent the characters of those about

him. Good temper, stability, care for others, self-control, and many

other habits; respect for truth, for the opinion of others, and many

other ideals, are unconsciously absorbed by the child in his early

years. Example not precept, actions not words, are the controlling

forces in moral education. Hence the great importance of the characters

of a child's companions, friends, and teachers, to say nothing of his

parents. Next to personalities, theaters, moving pictures, and books,

all have great suggestive power.



Third, there is always a danger that theory become divorced from

practice, and this is particularly true here because morality is

conduct. Knowing what is right is one thing, doing it is another, and

knowing does not result in doing unless definite connections are made

between the two. nstruction in morals may have but little effect on

conduct. t is only as the knowledge of what is right and good comes in

connection with social situations when there is the call for action that

true morality can be gained. Mere classroom instruction cannot insure

conduct. t is only as the family and the school become more truly

social institutions, where group activity such as one finds in life is

the dominant note, that we can hope to have morality and not ethics,

ideals and not passive appreciation, as a result of our teaching.



Fourth, it is without question true that in so far as the habits fixed

are "school habits" or "Sunday habits," or any other special type of

habits, formed only in connection with special situations, to that

extent we have no reason to expect moral conduct in the broader life

situations. The habits formed are those that will be put into practice,

and they are the only ones we are sure of. Because a child is truthful

in school, prompt in attendance, polite to his teacher, and so on is no

warrant that he will be the same on the playground or on the street.

Because a child can think out a problem in history or mathematics is no

warrant that he will therefore think out moral problems. The only sure

way is to see to it that he forms many useful habits out of school as

well as in, that he has opportunity to think out moral problems as well

as problems in school subjects.[18]



Fifth, individual differences must not be forgotten in moral training.

ndividual differences in suggestibility will influence the use of this

factor in habit formation. ndividual differences in power of

appreciation will influence the formation of ideals. Differences in

interest in books will result in differing degrees of knowledge.

Differences in maturity will mean that certain children in a class are

ready for facts concerning sex, labor and capital, crime, and so on,

long before other children in the same class should have such knowledge.

Differences in thinking power will determine efficiency in moral

situations just as in others.



The more carefully we consider the problem of moral social conduct, the

more apparent it becomes that the work of the school can be modified so

as to produce more significant results than are commonly now secured.

ndeed, it may be contended that in some respects the activities of the

school operate to develop an attitude which is largely individualistic,

competitive, and, if not anti-social, at least non-social. Although we

may not expect that the habits and attitudes which are developed in the

school will entirely determine the life led outside, yet one may not

forget that a large part of the life of children is spent under school

supervision. As children work in an atmosphere of cooeperation, and as

they form habits of helpfulness and openmindedness, we may expect that

in some degree these types of activity will persist, especially in their

association with each other. n a school which is organized to bring

about the right sort of moral social conduct we ought to expect that

children would grow in their power to accept responsibility for each

other. The writer knows of a fourth grade in which during the past year

a boy was absent from the room after recess. The teacher, instead of

sending the janitor, or she herself going to find the boy, asked the

class what they were going to do about it, and suggested to them their

responsibility for maintaining the good name which they had always borne

as a group. Two of the more mature boys volunteered to go and find the

boy who was absent. When they brought him into the room a little while

later, they remarked to the teacher in a most matter-of-fact way, "We do

not think that he will stay out after recess again." n the corridor of

an elementary school the writer saw during the past year two boys

sitting on a table before school hours in the morning. The one was

teaching the multiplication tables to the other. They were both

sixth-grade pupils,--the one a boy who had for some reason or other

never quite thoroughly learned his tables. The teacher had suggested

that somebody might help him, and a boy had volunteered to come early to

school in order that he might teach the boy who was backward. A great

many teachers have discovered that the strongest motive which they can

find for good work in the field of English is to be found in providing

an audience, both for the reading or story-telling, and for the English

composition. The idea which prevails is that if one is to read, he ought

to read well enough to entertain others. f one has enjoyed a story, he

may, if he prepares himself sufficiently well, tell it to the class or

to some other group.



Much more emphasis on the undertakings in the attempt to have children

accept responsibility, and to engage in a type of activity which has a

definite moral social value, is to be found in the schools in which

children are responsible for the morning exercises, or for publishing a

school paper, or for preparing a school festival. One of the most

notable achievements in this type of activity which the writer has ever

known occurred in a school in which a group of seventh-grade children

were thought to be particularly incompetent. The teachers had almost

despaired of having them show normal development, either intellectually

or socially. After a conference of all of the teachers who knew the

members of this group, it was decided to allow them to prepare a

patriot's day festival. The idea among those teachers who had failed

with this group was that if the children had a large responsibility,

they would show a correspondingly significant development. The children

responded to the motive which was provided, became earnest students of

history in order that they might find a dramatic situation, and worked

at their composition when they came to write their play, some of them

exercising a critical as well as a creative faculty which no one had

known that they possessed. But possibly the best thing about the whole

situation was that every member of the class found something to do in

their cooeperative enterprise. Some members of the class were engaged in

building and in decorating the stage scenery; others were responsible

for costumes; those who were strong in music devoted themselves to this

field. The search for a proper dramatic situation in history and the

writing of the play have already been suggested. The staging of the play

and its presentation to a large group of parents and other interested

patrons of the school required still further specialization and ability.

Out of it all came a realization of the possibility of accomplishing

great things when all worked together for the success of a common

enterprise. When the festival day came, the most common statement heard

in the room on the part of the parents and others interested in the work

of the children was expressed by one who said: "This is the most

wonderful group of seventh-grade children that have ever seen. They

are as capable as most high school boys and girls." t is to be recalled

that this was the group in whom the teachers originally had little

faith, and who had sometimes been called in their school a group of

misfits.



Some schools have found, especially in the upper grades, an opportunity

for a type of social activity which is entirely comparable with the

demand made upon the older members of our communities. This work for

social improvement or betterment is carried on frequently in connection

with a course in civics. n some schools there is organized what is

known as the junior police. This organization has been in some cases

coordinated with the police department. The boys who belong pledge

themselves to maintain, in so far as they are able, proper conditions on

the streets with respect to play, to abstain from the illegal use of

tobacco or other narcotics, and to be responsible for the correct

handling of garbage, especially to see that paper, ashes, and other

refuse are placed in separate receptacles, and that these receptacles

are removed from the street promptly after they are emptied by the

department concerned. n one city with which the writer is acquainted,

the children in the upper grades, according to the common testimony of

the citizens of their community, have been responsible for the cleaning

up of the street cars. n other cities they have become interested, and

have interested their parents, in the question of milk and water supply.

n some cases they have studied many different departments of the city

government, and have, in so far as it was possible, lent their

cooeperation. n one case a group of children became very much excited

concerning a dead horse that was allowed to remain on a street near the

school, and they learned before they were through just whose

responsibility it was, and how to secure the action that should have

been taken earlier.



Still another type of activity which may have significance for the moral

social development of children is found in the study of the life

activities in the communities in which they live. There is no reason why

children, especially in the upper grades or in the high school, should

not think about working conditions, especially as they involve

sweat-shops or work under unsanitary conditions. They may very properly

become interested in the problems of relief, and of the measures taken

to eliminate crime. ndeed, from the standpoint of the development of

socially efficient children, it would seem to be more important that

some elementary treatment of industrial and social conditions might be

found to be more important in the upper grades and in the high school

than any single subject which we now teach.



Another attempt to develop a reasonable attitude concerning moral

situations is found in the schools which have organized pupils for the

participation in school government. There is no particular value to be

attached to any such form of organization. t may be true that there is

considerable advantage in dramatizing the form of government in which

the children live, and for that purpose policemen, councilmen or

aldermen, mayors, and other officials, together with their election, may

help in the understanding of the social obligations which they will have

to meet later on. But the main thing is to have these children come to

accept responsibility for each other, and to seek to make the school a

place where each respects the rights of others and where every one is

working together for the common good. n this connection it is important

to suggest that schemes of self-government have succeeded only where

there has been a leader in the position of principal or other

supervisory officer concerned. Children's judgments are apt to be too

severe when they are allowed to discipline members of their group. There

will always be need, whatever attempt we may make to have them accept

responsibility, for the guidance and direction of the more mature mind.



We seek in all of these activities, as has already been suggested, to

have children come to take, in so far as they are able, the rational

attitude toward the problems of conduct which they have to face. t is

important for teachers to realize the fallacy of making a set of rules

by which all children are to be controlled. t is only with respect to

those types of activity in which the response, in order to further the

good of the group, must be invariable that we should expect to have

pupils become automatic. t is important in the case of a fire drill, or

in the passing of materials, and the like, that the response, although

it does involve social obligation, should be reduced to the level of

mechanized routine. Most school situations involve, or may involve,

judgment, and it is only as pupils grow in power of self-control and in

their willingness to think through a situation before acting, that we

may expect significant moral development. n the case of offenses which

seem to demand punishment, that teacher is wise who is able to place

responsibility with the pupil who has offended. The question ought to be

common, "What can do to help you?" The question which the teacher

should ask herself is not, "What can do to punish the pupil?" but

rather, "How can have him realize the significance of his action and

place upon him the responsibility of reinstating himself with the social

group?" The high school principal who solved the problem of a teacher

who said that she would not teach unless a particular pupil were removed

from her class, and of the pupil who said that she would not stay in

school if she had to go to that teacher, by telling them both to take

time to think it through and decide how they would reconcile their

differences, is a case in point. What we need is not the punishment

which follows rapidly upon our feeling of resentment, but rather the

wisdom of waiting and accepting the mistake or offense of the pupil as

an opportunity for careful consideration upon his part and as a possible

means of growth for him.



There has been considerable discussion during recent years concerning

the obligation of the school to teach children concerning matters of

sex. Traditionally, our policy has been one of almost entire neglect.

The consequence has been, on the whole, the acquisition upon the part of

boys and girls of a large body of misinformation, which has for the most

part been vicious. t is not probable that we can ever expect most

teachers to have the training necessary to give adequate instruction in

this field. For children in the upper grades, during the preadolescent

period especially, some such instruction given by the men and women

trained in biology, or possibly by men and women doctors who have made a

specialty of this field, promises a large contribution to the

development of the right attitudes with respect to the sex life and the

elimination of much of the immorality which has been due to ignorance or

to the vicious misinformation which has commonly been spread among

children. The policy of secrecy and ignorance cannot well be maintained

if we accept the idea of responsibility and the exercise of judgment as

the basis of moral social activity. n no other field are the results of

a lack of training or a lack of morality more certain to be disastrous

both for the individual and for the social group.





QUESTONS





1. How satisfactory is the morality of the man who claims that he does

no wrong?



2. How is it possible for a child to be unmoral and not immoral?



3. Are children who observe school rules and regulations necessarily

growing in morality?



4. Why is it important, from the standpoint of growth in morality, to

have children form socially desirable habits, even though we may not

speak of this kind of activity as moral conduct?



5. What constitutes growth in morality for the adult?



6. n what sense is it possible for the same act to be immoral, unmoral,

and moral for individuals living under differing circumstances and in

different social groups? Give an example.



7. Why have moral reformers sometimes been considered immoral by their

associates?



8. What is the moral significance of earning a living? Of being prompt?

Of being courteous?



9. What are the instincts upon which we may hope to build in moral

training? What instinctive basis is there for immoral conduct?



10. To what extent is intellectual activity involved in moral conduct?

What is the significance of one's emotional response?



11. What stages of development are distinguishable in the moral

development of children? s it possible to classify children as

belonging to one stage or the other by their ages?



12. Why is it true that one's character depends upon the deliberate

choices which he makes among several possible modes or types of action?



13. Why is it important to have positive satisfaction follow moral

conduct?



14. How may the conduct of parents and teachers influence conduct of

children?



15. What is the weakness of direct moral instruction, e.g. the telling

of stories of truthfulness, the teaching of moral precepts, and the

like?



16. What opportunities can you provide in your class for moral social

conduct?



17. Children will do what is right because of their desire to please,

their respect for authority, their fear of unpleasant consequences,

their careful, thoughtful analysis of the situation and choice of that

form of action which they consider right. Arrange these motives in order

of their desirability. Would you be satisfied to utilize the motive

which brings results most quickly and most surely?



18. n what sense is it true that lapses from moral conduct are the

teacher's best opportunity for moral teaching?



19. How may children contribute to the social welfare of the school

community? Of the larger social group outside of the school?



20. How may pupil participation in school government be made significant

in the development of social moral conduct?



* * * * *





X. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES FOR THE TEACHER XII. TRANSFER OF TRAINING facebooktwittergoogle_plusredditpinterestlinkedinmail

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